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INTRODUCTION
Consider the legal issues created by the following scenarios:
First, a police officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation. When
speaking to the driver, the officer recognizes the odor of marijuana
coming from within the vehicle. In a state where possession of
marijuana is a mere infraction, as opposed to a felony or misdemeanor,
may the officer search the vehicle for the marijuana? 1 Second, an
officer sees a driver who appears to be sending a text message. In a
state where texting and driving is an infraction offense, the officer
stops the vehicle, but the phone is nowhere to be seen. May the officer
search the car to find the phone? 2 Third, in a state where running a red
light is an infraction, an officer stops a vehicle for running a red light.
While speaking with the driver, the officer notices that the car has a
dashboard camera. May the officer search the car for the recording
unit, in order to seize the video? 3
Though they involve different facts, these three scenarios all pose
the same question of law; may an officer conduct a probable cause
search of a vehicle for evidence of an infraction, an offense that the
legislature has designated as less serious than even a misdemeanor?
The answer to this question is currently unclear. Notwithstanding the
wealth of case law regarding the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement, 4 few courts have considered how this rule applies to
infraction violations. 5
As the hypotheticals discussed above establish, this gap in the
case law will not last for long. Historically, infraction offenses have
rarely involved tangible evidence.6 Recent developments, however,
have increased the likelihood that infractions will involve tangible
proof. First, the proliferation of new, advanced technologies within
vehicles, such as GPS devices, on-board computers, and dashboard
cameras, provides tangible evidence for virtually any infraction. 7
Second, increased legislation that regulate activities that take place
inside vehicles, such as prohibiting the use of cellular devices while
driving, may implicate tangible evidence such as call logs, text-

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part II.A–B
See infra Part III.A–B.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
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message histories, and the cell phone itself. 8 Third, some states have
reduced the offense of possession of marijuana from a misdemeanor to
an infraction. 9
This Comment prescribes that in most cases; a search of a vehicle
for evidence of a mere infraction is unreasonable and violates the
Fourth Amendment. 10 It also proposes that there is one exception to
this general rule. Specifically, the rule will not apply where both an
infraction and a greater crime are implicated by a particular piece of
evidence or contraband, such as how the simple possession of
marijuana implicates that marijuana was either sold or cultivated. 11
The conclusion that a search of a vehicle based on an infraction is
unreasonable is supported by the history of the automobile exception
and the inherent differences between infractions and more serious
offenses. Section I will discuss the nature of infraction offenses and
how they differ from misdemeanors and felonies. 12 This section will
also address the recent changes in technology and the law that increase
the likelihood that tangible evidence contained within the vehicle will
provide proof of an infraction. Section II will discuss the automobile
exception and its application by courts. 13 As detailed in this portion of
the Comment, the United States Supreme Court has prescribed a
balancing test for ascertaining the reasonableness, and thus the
constitutionality of searches under the automobile exception. 14 The
Court, however, has never addressed how this balancing test applies to
the automobile exception when the offense being investigated is an
infraction. Section III will discuss how courts have taken an offense’s
classification as an infraction into account when assessing the
reasonableness of searches other than searches under the automobile
exception. 15 Section IV briefly explains that an expectation of privacy
exists in vehicles. 16 Section V sets the stage for the balancing inquiry
by examining the analyses of the lower courts that have addressed the
issue of searches under the automobile exception based on infraction
violations. Section VI then conducts an independent analysis of
automobile exception searches based on infraction violations. Section
VI concludes that, with one exception, a search of a vehicle for
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VI.A.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–300 (1999); see also infra Part II.B.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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evidence of a mere infraction cannot be justified under the automobile
exception. 17 Furthermore, this section concludes that the lower courts
that have considered this issue adopted flawed reasoning in reaching
their results. Lastly this section will examine why some state courts
will not have to engage in a balancing analysis to find an automobile
exception search based on an infraction unreasonable and why a search
based on an infraction possession of marijuana violation is never based
solely on an infraction.
This Comment will conclude by proposing a modified rule to
govern the automobile exception. Under the proposed rule, police may
search a motor vehicle when there is probable cause to believe that the
vehicle contains evidence or contraband related to a misdemeanor or
felony. 18
I. THE EXISTENCE OF DISCOVERABLE EVIDENCE OF INFRACTION
OFFENSES IS AN EMERGING ISSUE
Few courts have considered the danger posed by permitting
searches under the automobile exception where the only offense being
investigated is an infraction. 19 This is because changing circumstances
have only recently caused the issue to emerge. The proliferation of
technology and the increased regulation of activity inside of vehicles
has created situations where the investigation of an infraction can yield
collectable evidence. Similarly, as some legislatures have reclassified
the offense of marijuana possession as an infraction, they have created
an infraction offense which, by its nature, has collectable evidence.
The proliferation of technology has created collectable evidence
for many infraction violations where previously no evidence existed.
Many modern vehicles now carry event data recorders. 20 The type and
format of data they are required to record is already regulated by
statute 21 and a federal Senate bill proposed in 2012 would have
required that all newly manufactured vehicles carry event data

17. See infra Part VI.
18. See infra Conclusion.
19. The issue has been addressed by the Oregon Court of Appeals, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court and the California Court of Appeals. State v. Smalley, 225 P.3d 844, 845
(Or. Ct. App. 2010); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 911 (Mass. 2011); People v.
Waxler, No. A137796, 2014 WL 935470 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2014). These cases are
discussed in detail infra Part V.
20. Kashmir Hill, Hate to Break it to You, but Your Car Likely has a Black Box
‘Spying’ on You Already, FORBES (Apr. 14, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/04/19/hate-to-break-it-to-you-but-your-carlikely-has-a-black-box-spying-on-you-already/.
21. 49 C.F.R. § 563.6 (West 2014).
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recorders. 22 In a crash, these recorders register “ ‘a car’s speed, how far
the accelerator was pressed, the engine revolutions per minute, whether
the driver hit the brakes, whether the driver was wearing a safety belt,
and how long it took for the airbags to deploy.’ ” 23 While the owner or
lessee of the vehicle owns the data on the recorder 24 a search of that
data could still be justified under the automobile exception. 25
Event data recorders are only one of many emerging technologies
that have created discoverable digital evidence inside vehicles: some
drivers install dashboard cameras in their cars, 26 smart phones can
detect if a person is speeding, 27 and at least one insurance company
will give a discount to drivers who install a GPS recorder in their car,
which can measure speed. 28 The use of these and similar devices can
be expected to increase as technology proliferates. Each of these
devices has the ability to yield collectable evidence. An event data
recorder can show how a vehicle was operated in the moments before a
crash, to justify an at-fault determination in an accident; 29 a dashboard
camera showing the condition of a traffic light before a vehicle entered
an intersection could justify a red-light ticket; smart phone and GPS
records could justify a speeding ticket.
At the same time that technology is creating collectable evidence
for infractions, states are increasingly regulating the conduct of drivers
inside their vehicles. 30 That regulation creates new infractions, which
22. S. 1813, 112th Cong. § 31406(a)(1) (2012). The provisions requiring event data
recorders were not included in the bill that was ultimately passed. H.R. 4348, 112th Cong.
(2012).
23. Hill, supra note 20 (quoting Willie D. Jones, The Automotive Black Box, IEEE
SPECTRUM, (Apr. 4, 2012), http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/embedded-systems/theautomotive-black-box-data-dilemma/0.
24. A provision of the proposed Senate bill would have expressly stated that the owner
or lessee owned the data. S. 1813, 112th Cong. § 31406(b)(1) (2012).
25. A provision of the proposed Senate bill would have required a court order to
retrieve the data without the owner’s consent. S. 1813, 112th Cong. § 31406(b)(2)(A)
(2012).
26. Andrew Moran, Are Dash Cams Becoming a Necessity for Drivers to Avoid
Fraud?,
DIGITAL
JOURNAL
(Sept.
7,
2012),
http://digitaljournal.com/
article/332333.
27. Somini Sengupta, ‘Big Brother’? No, It’s Parents, N.Y. TIMES, (June 26, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/26/technology/software-helps-parents-monitor-theirchildren-online.html?_r=0.
28. Ian Bush, Part 1: A Spy in Your Car, PHILADELPHIA CBS, (Aug. 9, 2012),
http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2012/08/09/part-1-a-monitoring-device-in-your-car/.
29. In California, an officer who has been trained as a traffic collision investigator may
cite a person involved in the collision when the officer has reasonable cause to believe that
the person violated a provision of the vehicle code. CAL. VEH. CODE § 40600(a) (West
2012).
30. See, e.g., Distracted Driving Laws, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N,
http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/cellphone_laws.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
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by their nature have collectable evidence. These laws include
prohibitions against everything from smoking while children are
present, 31 to limiting the maximum temple-width of the driver’s
glasses. 32 Laws requiring the use of hands-free devices for phones and
prohibiting the use of text messaging functions while operating a
vehicle represent another type of regulation that has been implemented
in many states. 33 The regulation of the use of cellular phones has
created a situation where a cellular phone could be an important piece
of evidence in the investigation of an infraction. For example, in
California, although hands free devices are required 34 and text
messaging is prohibited, 35 drivers are expressly permitted to dial
numbers on their phone. 36 In a dispute as to whether a driver was
sending a text message or merely dialing a number, the phone itself
would be an excellent piece of evidence, as it may prove that the driver
violated the statute. 37
Another type of regulation undertaken by several states has
reclassified the possession of small amounts of marijuana from a
misdemeanor to an infraction. 38 This has already caused some courts to
question whether the same bright-line search and seizure rules that
govern most automobile exception searches can be applied to an
infraction possession of marijuana violation. 39
The result of this emerging technology, increased regulation, and
decriminalization of marijuana is that it has become unclear if searches
under the automobile exception are reasonable when they are
undertaken to find evidence of infraction violations. The question as to
whether these searches are reasonable may seem trivial, given the petty
nature of infractions. However this issue is important, because if
searches based on infractions are permitted, the officers conducting
those searches are likely to find evidence of other crimes. Small
searches often lead to big discoveries such as weapons, 40 drugs, 41 and
31. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 118948 (West 2012).
32. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 23120 (West 2012).
33. See Shannon L. Noder, Talking and Texting While Driving: A Look at Regulating
Cell Phone Use Behind the Wheel, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 237 (2009).
34. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23123(a) (West 2012).
35. Id. § 23123.5(a).
36. Id. § 23123.5(c). Without this provision some drivers would be unable to initiate or
receive calls, even while using a hands free device.
37. Although there are likely other ways to get this information, looking at the phone
would be an easy method. See Eric Lichtblau, More Demands on Cell Carriers in
Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2012, at A1.
38. See, e.g., S.B. 1449 (Cal. 2010), S.B. 1014 (Conn. 2011), S.B. 2253 (R.I. 2012).
39. See infra Part III.
40. See, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1985).
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cell phone messages containing evidence of drug sales42 or cell phones
containing child pornography. 43 Defendants facing charges related to
those discoveries will be eager to challenge the search of their vehicles.
Vehicle stops are the most common type of detention conducted by
police officers, 44 and about five percent of traffic stops lead to a search
of the driver, vehicle, or both. 45 As such, even though infractions are
not serious violations in themselves, courts will likely be forced to
address the issue of whether or not an automobile exception search
based on an infraction violation is reasonable.
II. THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION REQUIRES THE APPLICATION OF
BALANCING
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment 46 as
creating a “warrant requirement.” 47 Under the warrant requirement,
searches of protected areas are “presumptively unreasonable in the
absence of a search warrant.” 48 One of the ways in which that
presumption can be overcome is under the “automobile exception.” 49
A. The Origins of the Automobile Exception
Many commonly refer to searches under the automobile exception
as “Ross” searches, 50 after the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Ross. 51 The holding in Ross frames reasonableness as a
balancing of two competing interests: the public interest on one side
and the individual’s expectation of privacy on the other. 52 In Ross,
officers obtained information from an informant that Albert Ross was

41. See, e.g., State v. Smalley, 225 P.3d 844, 845 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
42. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 502 (Cal. 2011).
43. Cell phones are capable of containing child pornography. Because these images
can be sent via text message, an officer checking a phone for text messages may come
across those images. See, Jan Hoffman, A Girls Nude Photo, and Altered Lives, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2011, at A1.
44. Traffic Stops, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=702 (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
45. Id.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
47. See, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1669 (2012).
48. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
49. See U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 808-09 (1982); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565, 566 (1991); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 309 (1999).
50. See Steven D. Soden, Expansion of the Automobile Exception to the Warrant
Requirement: Police Discretion Replaces the Neutral and Detached Magistrate, 57 MO. L.
REV. 661, 671 (1992).
51. U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
52. Id. at 804.
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selling drugs, and that Ross had drugs in his vehicle. 53 After
corroborating some of the information, the officers stopped Ross’s car
and searched it, finding a gun, cash, and drugs. 54
The Court’s analysis began by observing that the case presented a
conflict “between the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in
privacy and the public interest in effective law enforcement.” 55 The
court determined that waiting to obtain a warrant would have been
impractical 56 and found that the search was valid, because it was
supported by probable cause. 57 The Court stated that, “an individual’s
expectation of privacy in a vehicle and its contents may not survive if
probable cause is given to believe that the vehicle is transporting
contraband.” 58
While the language in Ross limited the automobile exception to
searches for contraband, 59 the exception was soon expanded to include
searches for evidence of a crime. The Court in California v. Acevedo,60
under facts similar to Ross, 61 where police officers had reason to
believe that Charles Acevedo had drugs inside a bag in the trunk of his
vehicle, 62 ruled that “The police may search an automobile and the
containers within it where they have probable cause to believe
contraband or evidence is contained.” 63
Together, Ross and Acevedo lay down a bright-line rule that police
may search a vehicle 64 they have stopped when there is probable cause
to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence. 65 The Court
reached that rule by balancing the same interests the Court balances
when analyzing other types of searches: an individual’s privacy interest

53. Id. at 801.
54. Id. at 801–02.
55. Id. at 804.
56. Id. at 806–07.
57. Id. at 808–09.
58. Id. at 823.
59. Id.
60. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
61. Reading the cases reveals their similarity. The Court in Acevedo also noted the
similarity in the facts. Id. at 572–73.
62. See id. at 566–67.
63. Id. at 580.
64. While each of the cases that created the rule for probable cause vehicle searches
require that there be a possibility the vehicle could be moved before a warrant is obtained,
the Supreme Court set that bar low in Pennsylvania v. Labron, so that “[i]f a car is readily
mobile and probable cause exists . . . the Fourth Amendment [will] thus permit[] police to
search the vehicle without more.” Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996).
65. See Daniel T. Gillespie, Bright-Line Rules: Development of the Law of Search and
Seizure During Traffic Stops, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 2 (1999).
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against the government’s interest. 66
B. The Reasonableness of a Search Under the Automobile Exception is
Measured by Weighing the Governmental Interest Against the
Individual’s Expectation of Privacy
A search must be reasonable to survive Fourth Amendment
scrutiny. That reasonableness requirement applies evenhandedly to all
types of warrantless searches, including consent searches,67 inventory
searches, 68 searches incident to an arrest, 69 as well as parole, 70 and
Vehicle searches under the “automobile
probation searches. 71
exception” to the warrant requirement have long been considered to be
reasonable. 72
In a recent application of the automobile exception, Wyoming v.
Houghton, 73 the Court explicitly adopted a balancing test to determine
whether a search under the automobile exception was reasonable. 74
The Court balanced an individual’s expectation of privacy on one side
and the government’s interest on the other, observing that:
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” In determining whether a
particular governmental action violates this provision, we inquire
first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or
seizure under the common law when the Amendment was framed.
Where that inquiry yields no answer, we must evaluate the search
or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by
66. See supra Part II.
67. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Consent searches are
discussed at length in Tracey Maclin, The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in
The Supreme Court, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 27 (2008).
68. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
69. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). Searches incident to an arrest are
discussed at length in George M. Dery III, A Case of Doubtful Certainty: The Court
Relapses into Search Incident to Arrest Confusion in Arizona v. Gant, 44 IND. L. REV. 395
(2011).
70. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846-48 (2006) (“[R]easonableness is
determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.”).
71. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (“[T]he reasonableness of a
search is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate government interests.”).
72. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 566 (1991).
73. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
74. The balancing test use in Houghton is the same test later used in Knights and
Samson. Supra notes 70–71.
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assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is
75
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.

The Court then described that evaluating a search and seizure
requires a “balancing of the relative interests.” 76
The Houghton Court recognized that the interests in this balancing
equation vary, depending on the circumstances of the search.
Houghton held that officers with probable cause to search a car may
search a passenger’s belongings, provided that they may contain the
target of the search. 77 The Court distinguished the search of a vehicle
from the search of a passenger in the vehicle, because one’s person has
a greater privacy interest than a vehicle, triggering “ ‘significantly
heightened protection,’ ” so that a search of the passenger’s person
would not be reasonable. 78 The Court’s use of that distinction, where
the search of a vehicle would be reasonable but the search of the person
of a passenger in that vehicle would not, demonstrates that whether a
search is reasonable or unreasonable can differ between searches that
are similar on their face, but implicate different interests. Similarly,
automobile exception searches based on infraction violations do not
implicate the same interests as searches based on more serious
violations.
The Court has not yet considered the permissibility of a search
under the automobile exception where probable cause exists only as to
evidence of an infraction offense. As related below, however, the
Court has held elsewhere that an offense’s designation as a mere
infraction limits the investigative steps that law enforcement officers
may take. 79
III. THERE IS A DECREASED GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST IN
INFRACTIONS
A. The Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals Have
Recognized That There is a Decreased Governmental Interest in
Infractions.
In Welsh v. Wisconsin, 80 instead of a vehicle search based on an
infraction, the United States Supreme Court examined the search of a
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299–300 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
Id. at 303.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 303.
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984); infra Part III.
466 U.S. 740 (1984).
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home, where officers were conducting a driving under the influence
investigation. 81 At the time in question, Wisconsin classified a firstoffense DUI as a civil infraction. 82 The Court found that the officers’
entry into the defendant’s home, while conducting their investigation,
was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. 83 In
reaching this conclusion, the court considered the governmental
interest in an infraction violation stating:
The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for
driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense
for which no imprisonment is possible. This is the best indication
of the State’s interest in precipitating an arrest, and is one that can
be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a
decision to arrest. Given this expression of the State’s interest, a
warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld . . . To allow a
warrantless home entry on these facts would be to approve
unreasonable police behavior that the principles of the Fourth
84
Amendment will not sanction.

The Court’s focus on the difference between an infraction and a
more serious offense demonstrates both that there is a decreased
governmental interest in infractions and that the decreased interest is a
factor in weighing reasonableness. 85
While Welsh dealt with the search of a home for the violation of a
mere infraction, the New York Court of appeals addressed the search of
a vehicle following a detention for an infraction in People v. Class.86
In Class, police officers stopped a vehicle driven by Benigno Class
after they observed two infractions: speeding and a broken
windshield. 87 After stopping, Class stepped out of his car and spoke
with one of the officers. The second officer went to the vehicle and
opened the door to check the door jam for the vehicle identification
number (“VIN”). 88 Finding no VIN on the door jam, the officer
reached into the vehicle and moved some papers that were obscuring
the area of the dashboard where the VIN is located in newer model
vehicles. 89 While doing so, that officer saw the handle of a gun
protruding from under the driver’s seat of the vehicle, and then seized

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 741–43.
Id. at 747 n.6.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 754.
See supra Part III.B.
People v. Class, 472 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1984), rev’d, 475 U.S. 106 (1985).
New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 107–08 (1985).
Id.
Id.
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the gun. 90 The opinion of the Court of Appeals focused on the
reasonableness of a search when there was no suspicion of
wrongdoing, other than the two infractions. 91 The court found that
“[t]he facts reveal[ed] no reason for the officer to suspect other
criminal activity or to act to protect his own safety. The sole predicate
for the officer’s action here was defendant’s commission of an ordinary
traffic infraction, an offense which, standing alone, did not justify the
search.” 92 While Class concerned a VIN, 93 rather than evidence of an
infraction or contraband amounting to an infraction, the New York
Court of Appeals was unwilling to permit a search for such a minor
offense. 94
Although Class was overturned by the Supreme Court in New
York v. Class, 95 the Court overturned the Court of Appeals on the
grounds that there was no expectation of privacy in a vehicle’s VIN,
rather than by weighing the state’s interest in pursuing the infraction
violations. 96 Since the New York Court of Appeals was applying the
normal expectation of privacy in vehicles and not the lack of such an
expectation in the VIN, 97 the reasoning of the Court of Appeals can
still be applied to those portions of a vehicle where an expectation of
privacy exists.
B. There is a Meaningful Difference Between Infractions and
Misdemeanors
Infractions and misdemeanors are both classifications of offenses.
Infractions are distinguishable from misdemeanors by the
government’s interest in identifying and prosecuting offenders, 98 the
available punishments, 99 and the societal consequences outside of the
criminal justice system associated with a conviction.100 These factors

90. Id.
91. See People v. Class, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 (N.Y. 1984), rev’d, 475 U.S. 106
(1985). There was also a question as to whether the search had really been in order to
uncover the VIN, as the officer conducting the search never radioed in or recorded the VIN
number. People v. Class, 97 A.D.2d 741, 741–42 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983), rev’d, 472 N.E.2d
1009 (N.Y. 1984).
92. Class, 472 N.E.2d at 1012, rev’d, 475 U.S. 106 (1985).
93. Id. at 1010.
94. Id. at 1012.
95. 475 U.S. 106 (1985).
96. See id. at 114.
97. See People v. Class, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 1012–13 (N.Y. 1984), rev’d, 475 U.S. 106
(1985).
98. See infra Part III.B.
99. See infra Part III.B.
100. See infra Part III.B.
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are interrelated, but it is in the government interest that a distinction
with significance can be found.
The label of an offense as a felony, misdemeanor, or infraction
signals the level of the government’s interest in that offense. Labeling
an offense as an infraction signals that the government has a reduced
interest in prosecuting the offense, as well as the government’s desire
to expend fewer resources policing that type of offense. 101 For
example, California demonstrated a diminished interest in unlawful
possession of marijuana, when the Legislature enacted a bill that
reduced possession of less than one ounce of marijuana from a
misdemeanor to an infraction. 102 That bill expressed the desire to avoid
jury trials and to “keep[] low-level offenders out of court.” 103 The
government’s intention that offenders receive low-level treatment is
evidence of the reduced governmental interest in those offences.
The California Legislature is not the only entity to acknowledge a
decreased governmental interest in infractions. The Supreme Court, in
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 104 reached the same conclusion, finding a
decreased governmental interest in prosecuting civil infractions. While
discussing the nature of an infraction, the Court explained that, the
offense’s label as an infraction “is the best indication of the State’s
interest in precipitating an arrest, and is one that can be easily
identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to
arrest.” 105 The government does not have the same interest in
identifying and convicting those that commit infractions, as it does in
identifying and convicting those that commit misdemeanors and
felonies. 106
The decreased interest of both the government and society is also
expressed by the authorized punishment for a particular offense
classification. The maximum punishment for infractions is a fine 107 or
101. In his S.B. 1449 (Cal. 2010) signing statement, former California Governor
Schwarzenegger wrote, “law enforcement, and the courts cannot afford to expend limited
resources prosecuting a crime that carries the same punishment as a traffic ticket.” Bonnie
King, Governor Schwarzenegger Signs Bill to Reduce Marijuana Penalties in California,
SALEM-NEWS.COM,
(Oct.
1,
2010),
http://www.salemnews.com/articles/october012010/schwarzenegger-marijuana.php.
102. S.B. 1449 (Cal. 2010).
103. S.B. 1449 (Cal. Assembly Floor Analysis, June 25, 2010), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_1401-1450/sb_1449_cfa
_20100625_150316_asm_floor.html.
104. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
105. Id. at 754.
106. While the ultimate decision in Welsh is distinguishable, on its facts, from a vehicle
search, the Court’s rationale demonstrates that there is a decreased governmental interest in
infractions.
107. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 3 (6th ed. 2012).
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other punishment short of imprisonment, such as community service, 108
or a driver’s license suspension. 109 The maximum punishment for
misdemeanors varies, depending on the offense, from a monetary fine,
to incarceration in a jail, or a combination of the two. 110 Misdemeanors
may result in imprisonment, 111 while infractions may not. 112 That
imprisonment is completely unavailable as a punishment for infraction
violations signals that the government has a lower interest in punishing
those offenders.
Punishments administered by the government, such as fines and
imprisonment are not the only consequences of criminal convictions.
Another, appreciable, difference between misdemeanors and
infractions is the societal consequences associated with a conviction.
The difference in the societal consequences between felonies and
misdemeanors are sharply drawn. For example, felons cannot possess
firearms 113 and the courts permit the use of a felony conviction for
impeachment of testimony, regardless of the offense.114 The distinction
between misdemeanors and infractions is more subtle. For example, in
California, infractions do not appear on a person’s criminal record,
while misdemeanors appear for a limited time. 115 That criminal record
that follows misdemeanors can affect future events, such as
As such, misdemeanor
employment or rental applications. 116
convictions can affect entire areas of a person’s life, while infractions
affect only the pocket book. 117 There is a lower societal interest in
108. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1209.5 (West 2014).
109. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 13202.5 (West 2014).
110. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.6(a), at 48 (2d ed. 2003).
111. The line blurs when comparing a misdemeanor punishable only by a fine, such as
possession of less than one ounce of marijuana in California prior to 2011, (CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY § 11357(b) (West 2010)) with an infraction punishable only by a fine, such as
possession of less one ounce of marijuana in California after 2011. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
§ 11357(b) (West 2014). There, the only true difference is the label. Both the low level
misdemeanor and the infraction are punishable by a fine only. Therefore, the available
punishment is not a trait that can be used to distinguish all misdemeanors from all
infractions. This dilemma only arises when the available punishment for a misdemeanor is
set as a fine by the legislature.
112. DRESSLER, supra note 107, at 3.
113. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (West 2012).
114. FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (2011).
115. Kathleen Pender, When Marijuana Possession Becomes an Infraction,
S.F.GATE.COM (Nov. 7, 2010), http://www.sfgate.com/business/networth/article/
When-marijuana-possession-becomes-an-infraction-3247238.php#page-1. Court records
will still be locatable, if they are checked. Id.
116. See Paul Bergman, Expunging or Sealing an Adult Criminal Record, NOLO,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/expungement-of-criminal-records
-basics-32641.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
117. See infra Part I.
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holding the offender accountable and accordingly, less interest in
convicting the offender.
The decreased societal interest in infractions complements the
decreased government interest. Both are evidence of the same
conclusion. The people and their government care less about
infractions, because infractions are minor violations.
IV. THERE IS AN EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN VEHICLES
The existence of an expectation of privacy in a vehicle is a more
settled point than the governmental interest in infractions. A person
does not have the same expectation of privacy in a vehicle as they do
their home. 118 The Supreme Court has explained that:
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because
its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence
or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for
escaping public scrutiny. It travels pubic thoroughfares where both
119
its occupants and its contents are in plain view.

The Court has further justified the diminished expectation of
privacy in vehicles by explaining that “the ready mobility of the
automobile justifies a lesser degree of protection of those interests,” 120
and that the “reduced expectations of privacy derives not from the fact
that the area to be searched is in plain view, but from the pervasive
regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways.” 121
While the expectation is not a defined numerical value, there is an
expectation of privacy in vehicles. 122 It is sufficient, for the purposes
of this Comment, to recognize that while the expectation of privacy in
a vehicle is less than in a home, some expectation of privacy in
vehicles exists. 123 That expectation remains constant in the analysis of
searches under the automobile exception, whether the offense being
investigated is an infraction, or a more serious offense such as a
misdemeanor or felony.
118. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
119. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
120. Carney, 471 U.S. at 390.
121. Id. at 392.
122. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009).
123. Gant, 556 U.S. at 345 (“Although we have recognized that a motorist’s privacy
interest in his vehicle is less substantial than in his home, the former interest is nevertheless
important
and
deserving
of
constitutional
protection
. . . .”) (citing New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112–13 (1986); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S.
113, 117 (2000)). For an argument that cars have a greater expectation of privacy than
currently recognized by the court, see Cecil J. Hunt, II, Calling in the Dogs: Suspicionless
Sniff Searches and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 285, 342–
43 (2005).
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V. LOWER COURT’S HAVE COME TO CONFLICTING CONCLUSIONS
WHEN ANALYZING AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION SEARCHES BASED ON
INFRACTION VIOLATIONS
While Class 124 and Welsh 125 both touch on the issue of searches
based on infractions, neither reaches the discrete issue that is the focus
of this Comment. The Oregon Court of Appeals, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court, and the California Court of Appeals have addressed
the issue, in the context of marijuana possession. Those courts each
addressed the search of a vehicle for marijuana, where possession of
less than one ounce of marijuana was an infraction. 126
The Oregon Court of Appeals addressed a search of a vehicle for
evidence of marijuana possession, which was an infraction in Oregon,
in the case of State v. Smalley. 127 In Smalley, an officer conducted a
traffic stop and observed an odor of marijuana coming from the
vehicle. 128 At that time, possession of less than one ounce of marijuana
was an infraction in Oregon 129 and the officer had no reason to suspect
that there was more than an ounce of marijuana in the vehicle. 130 The
officer conducted a search of the vehicle and found marijuana in a
backpack placed behind a seat in the vehicle. 131 The appellate court
relied on a state supreme court decision similar to Ross, which allowed
for searches of vehicles when an officer had “probable cause to believe
. . . a[n] automobile, which was mobile at the time of the stop contains
contraband or crime evidence. . . .” 132 The court found that the
language “contraband or crime evidence” was significant, because if
the automobile exception was limited to cases where possession of the
contraband was a crime, the words “crime evidence” would have been
sufficient to define the limits of the exception. 133 The court then
applied the automobile exception to the infraction violation at issue,
holding that because any amount of marijuana is contraband, 134 the
search was reasonable under the automobile exception. The court did
not consider any type of balancing. 135
124. People v. Class, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 (N.Y. 1984), rev’d, 475 U.S. 106 (1985).
125. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
126. See infra Part III.B.
127. State v. Smalley, 225 P.3d 844 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
128. Id. at 845.
129. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.864(3) (2009).
130. State v. Smalley, 225 P.3d 844, 845 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 846 (quoting State v. Brown, 721 P.2d 1357, 1362 (Or. 1986)).
133. Id. at 848.
134. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 365 (9th ed. 2009)).
135. See State v. Smalley, 225 P.3d 844, 848 (Or. Ct. App. 2010). The court's analysis
of the entire case was limited to four pages and the court indicated that it felt bound by

VAN DER HOEK FINAL

2014]

AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION SEARCHES

8/21/2014 4:09 PM

809

In a case decided after Smalley, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
reached the opposite conclusion. In Commonwealth v. Cruz, 136 the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts suppressed crack cocaine found
during a search. 137 The court found that an officer’s investigation of
possession of less than one ounce of marijuana did not justify a vehicle
search under the “automobile exception.” 138 In Cruz, two officers
contacted the defendant after they observed his car parked next to a fire
hydrant. 139 The officers smelled an odor of marijuana coming from the
vehicle. 140 There was nothing to indicate that the quantity of marijuana
was greater than one ounce and in Massachusetts, possession of less
than once ounce of marijuana 141 and stopping next to a fire hydrant 142
were infractions, distinct from criminal violations.143 The officers
waited for the arrival of four additional officers and then instructed the
defendant, a passenger in the vehicle, to step out of the vehicle. 144
Once out of the vehicle, the defendant admitted that he had crack
cocaine in his pocket, which one of the officers recovered. 145 In
Massachusetts, under most circumstances, officers could not order a
passenger out of a vehicle unless the officers had “reasonable suspicion
(based on articulable facts) that the defendant was engaged in criminal
activity separate from any offense of the driver,” or “to facilitate a
search of the vehicle.” 146 As such, the court considered whether the
officers had sufficient grounds to search the vehicle under the
automobile exception. The court considered Smalley, but was not
persuaded by the reasoning of the Smalley court. 147 The Cruz court
ruled that Massachusetts law required a different outcome than Smalley
because under Massachusetts state law, warrants could not be issued to
locate evidence of non-criminal violations 148 and that there could be no
precedent. See id. at 845 n.1. In State v. Kurokawa-Lasciak, the Oregon Court of Appeals
reached the same conclusion, using the same type of analysis, on similar facts. See State v.
Kurokawa-Lasciak, 239 P.3d 1046 (Or. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 263 P.3d
336 (2011).
136. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899 (Mass. 2011).
137. Id. at 914.
138. Id. at 913.
139. Id. at 902.
140. Id. at 903.
141. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32L (West 2010).
142. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 903 (Mass. 2011) (citing BOSTON,
MASS., TRAFFIC R. & REGS. art. 4, § 1(6) (2003)).
143. Id. at 903, 905 n.9.
144. Id. at 903.
145. Id. at 904.
146. Id. at 906 (citing Commonwealth v. Bostock, 880 N.E.2d 759, 765 (Mass. 2008)).
147. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d at 912.
148. Id. at 913.
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exception to the warrant requirement where no warrant could have
been obtained. 149 The court’s decision was thus based only on
Massachusetts law and the court recognized that by noting that the
outcome might be different in other jurisdictions. 150
In People v. Waxler, 151 the California First Appellate District
similarly addressed the search of a vehicle under the automobile
exception, where possession of a small amount of marijuana was
classified as an infraction. 152 In Waxler, a deputy searched a vehicle
after smelling an odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle and seeing
a marijuana pipe, with burnt marijuana in the bowl, in plain view. The
deputy then searched the vehicle and found methamphetamine. 153 The
court applied the automobile exception rule and found that a search
was justified, as a search for contraband. 154 The Waxler court
recognized that its conclusion, that any amount of marijuana was
contraband and justified a search under the automobile exception, was
similar to the conclusion reached by the Smalley court. 155 Waxler then
distinguished Cruz, because unlike in Massachusetts, in California,
committing an infraction is a “crime” and because California law
permitted automobile exception searches for any type of contraband. 156
Like the Smalley and Cruz courts, the Waxler court did not undertake a
balancing analysis. 157
VI. THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION CANNOT JUSTIFY THE SEARCH OF A
VEHICLE FOR EVIDENCE OF A MERE INFRACTION
Searches based on infraction violations should be found
unreasonable when the expectation of privacy in a vehicle is weighed
against the state interest in infraction violations. The automobile
exception should not be applied as a blanket rule and courts should be
examined as a weighing of those two interests. 158 The Supreme Court
has stated that, “[i]n determining whether to grant an exception to the
warrant requirement, courts should carefully consider the facts and
149. Id.
150. Id. at 913 n.31 (quoting United States v. Pugh, 223 F. Supp. 2d 325, 330 (D. Me.
2002)).
151. People v. Waxler, No. A137796, 2014 WL 935470 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2014).
152. Id. at *1.
153. Id. at *2.
154. Id. at *4 (discussing that marijuana is “contraband,” and may provide probable
cause to search a vehicle under the automobile exception).
155. Id. at *5.
156. Id. at *6.
157. See State v. Smalley, 225 P.3d 844, 846 (Or. Ct. App. 2010); Commonwealth v.
Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 906 (Mass. 2011); Waxler, 2014 WL 935470, at *7.
158. See, e.g., Smalley, 225 P.3d at 846.
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circumstances of each search and seizure, focusing on the reasons
supporting the exception rather than on any bright-line rule of general
application,” 159 and that, “[t]here is no formula for the determination of
reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and
circumstances.” 160
An examination of the circumstances that led to the creation of the
automobile exception reveals that in Ross, Acevedo, and Houghton, the
police officers were investigating serious drug offenses. 161 In the case
relied on by the Oregon appellate court in Smalley, police officers were
investigation the unlawful carrying of a concealed handgun. 162
Comparing the seriousness of those offenses to the pettiness of an
infraction violation reveals that the governmental interest in infractions
is substantially lower than the governmental interest that existed in the
cases that gave rise to the automobile exception.
A court determining the reasonableness of an automobile
exception search based on an infraction should adopt the rule that such
searches are unreasonable and should be prohibited. A court could
adopt that rule without disturbing the automobile exception, which was
created for misdemeanor and felony offenses. 163 Infractions are
different from more serious violations. As a result, when the
expectation of privacy is weighed on one side, 164 and the governmental
interest in an infraction is weighed on the other 165 the scale tips towards
privacy.
This Comment does not suggest the abolition of the bright-line
rules of Ross and Acevedo. 166 It recommends a delineation of the
grounds to which the rule applies, with infractions on one side and
more serious offenses on the other. The Supreme Court has recognized
that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not insist upon bright-line rules.
Rather it recognizes that no single set of legal rules can capture the

159. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 464 (1981), overturned by, 556 U.S. 332 (2009)
(Brennan J., dissenting) (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968); Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).
160. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
161. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 801 (1982) (officers found a bag containing
heroin); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 566–67 (1991) (a large quantity of marijuana
had been shipped from Hawaii); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (officers
searched a vehicle for contraband after noticing a hypodermic needle in the driver’s shirt
pocket).
162. State v. Brown, 721 P.2d 1357, 1358 (Or. 1986).
163. See supra Part II.
164. See supra Part IV.
165. See supra Part II.B.
166. See supra Part II.
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ever-changing complexity of human life.” 167 However, bright-light
rules are not without their benefits. 168 The Court has also recognized
that bright-line rules can provide “a single, familiar standard. . . to
guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to
reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the
specific circumstances they confront.” 169 Prohibiting automobile
exceptions searches based on infraction violations, but allowing those
searches during the investigation of misdemeanors and felonies
embraces both these principles.
It recognizes the changing
complexities of human life that have led to the existence of
discoverable evidence for a number of petty offenses, while still
providing police officers with guidance on when an automobile
exception search is permitted.
A consideration of the potential consequences of a ruling allowing
automobile exception searches based on infractions shows that public
policy cannot allow such searches. The continued introduction of new
technology creates collectable digital evidence as well as new
distractions for drivers that may result in new prohibitions of in-car
conduct. 170 People have a real expectation of privacy in their
vehicles. 171 That expectation would become illusory if a vehicle search
were permitted for almost every possible violation; police would be
justified in searching a vehicle during almost every traffic stop. The
expectation of privacy in a vehicle would lose its meaning and the right
to privacy in a vehicle would erode at the same rate that technology
expands.
As with any rule that inhibits the ability of police to detect
violations and enforce laws, there would be a societal cost of “letting
guilty
and
possibly
dangerous
[people]
go
free. . . .” 172 Here, when the cost of letting infraction violators go free is
weighed against the liberty interest of the people, the scales tip in the
favor of liberty. “Those who would give up essential liberty, to
purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.” 173

167. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 125 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring).
168. Gillespie, supra note 65, at 3.
169. New York v. Belton 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981), overturned by 556 U.S. 332 (2009)
(quoting Dunaway v. New York, 443 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)).
170. See supra Part I.
171. See James A. Adams, The Supreme Court’s Improbable Justifications for
Restriction of Citizens’ Fourth Amendment Privacy Expectations in Automobiles, 47 DRAKE
L. REV. 833, 835 (1999).
172. Herring v. U.S., 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009).
173. Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor, November 11,
1755, in 6 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 242 (Leonard W. Labaree ed., 1963).
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Adopting a rule that prohibited searches based on infraction violations
would not allow red light runners and speeders to commit violations
without fear of prosecution. Police still have other options available
for enforcement, 174 which don’t require searches in response to minor
offenses.
A. Infraction Possession of Marijuana Violations Will Not Be Balanced
at the Same Level As Other Infractions, Because Marijuana Possession
Implicates More Serious Crimes
While the application of balancing will lead to the conclusion that
a search under the automobile exception is unreasonable in cases such
as texting while driving or speeding, 175 cases involving infraction
possession of marijuana will receive different treatment. That different
treatment is because before infraction possession of marijuana can
occur, either the possessor or another party must have committed a
felony. The marijuana in question came from somewhere and as such,
the marijuana was either illegally cultivated or illegally sold to the
unlawful possessor. 176 In the cases of Cruz and Smalley, the courts
reasoned that there was nothing that could lead officers to believe that
there was more than one ounce of marijuana in the vehicle and that as
such, the most serious offense being investigated was the infraction
possession of marijuana. 177 However, that infraction possession of
marijuana was not the only offense implicated. The possession of
marijuana requires a source of marijuana, meaning that the marijuana
was either sold to, or cultivated by, the person possessing it. As such,
the marijuana is evidence of a felony. Specifically, either the unlawful
sale of, 178 or unlawful cultivation of, marijuana. 179
Furthermore, possession of marijuana remains a felony under
federal law180 and state officers are permitted to investigate and make
174. Traditional methods include hiding in bushes and behind billboards. In an
interesting example, an officer in Florida dressed in a giant bunny costume to find seatbelt
violators. Cythia Roldan, West Palm Beach police use bunny costume to enforce seat-belt
law,
PALM
BEACH
POST
(Mar.
28,
2012),
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/traffic/west-palm-beach-police-use-bunnycostume-to-enfo-1/nLh3B/.
175. See supra Part III.
176. It is conceivable that a person unlawfully possession marijuana may obtain it in
some other way such as finding it. However that does not change the analysis here, as
officers would still have probable cause that either unlawful cultivation or unlawful
distribution occurred.
177. See supra Part V.
178. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11359 (West 2012).
179. See, e.g., id. § 11358.
180. 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012); See also, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (finding
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arrests for federal offenses. 181 As such, the governmental interest is not
at the level of an infraction. Instead, the governmental interest it is at
the level of a felony because in every case, a felony must have been
committed by someone in order for the current possessor to acquire the
marijuana and because in every case, the possessor is committing a
felony. Once felony crimes are implicated, Houghton can be applied
without considering the decreased level of governmental interest in
infractions and a search will be reasonable if the officer has probable
cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence.182
While the law varies from state to state as to what constitutes probable
cause that a vehicle contains marijuana, 183 any marijuana would be
evidence. Black’s Law Dictionary, 184 defines evidence as “[s]omething
. . . that tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact . . .
.” 185 Since marijuana in a vehicle tends to prove that someone is in
possession of marijuana and that the possessor cultivated the marijuana
or purchased the marijuana from a third party, it is evidence of those
crimes. So long as the particular states probable cause threshold is met,
the search will be valid. 186
B. States That Do Not Authorize Search Warrants for Infraction
Violations May Not Reach Balancing
Although the application of balancing should lead to the
conclusion that a probable cause search based on an infraction violation
is unreasonable, some states will find the search unreasonable on other
grounds before reaching the balancing test. They may conclude that
there cannot be an exception to the warrant requirement where no
warrant could possibly be obtained to search for the evidence. As such,
they would not even begin the balancing analysis.
In the Massachusetts Supreme Court Case Commonwealth v.
that federal marijuana law is a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause, even if marijuana use
is legal under state law)).
181. People v. Barajas, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); Marsh v. United States,
29 F.2d 172, 173–74 (2d Cir. 1928).
182. See supra Part V.
183. See Michael A. Sprow, Wake Up and Smell the Contraband: Why Courts that do
not Find Probable Cause Based on Odor Alone Are Wrong, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 289
(2000).
184. Black’s Law Dictionary was chosen because that was the choice of the courts in
Cruz and Smalley, when they sought to define “contraband.” Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945
N.E.2d 899, 911 (Mass. 2011); State v. Smalley, 225 P.3d 844, 848 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
185. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 635 (9th ed. 2009).
186. For an article otherwise critical of the Commonwealth v. Cruz decision, see John
Sullivan, Reasonable Suspicion of an Unjust Conclusion: How Commonwealth v. Cruz
Cripples Enforcement of Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 94c, § 32l, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 877 (2012).

VAN DER HOEK FINAL

2014]

8/21/2014 4:09 PM

AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION SEARCHES

815

Cruz, 187 the court found that because no warrant could have obtained
under the state’s search warrant statute, 188 there could be no exception
to the warrant requirement. 189 A potential flaw in that reasoning is that
there are already several exceptions to the warrant requirement in
situations where no warrant can be obtained. Those situations include
searches incident to an arrest, 190 inventory searches, 191 stop and frisk
searches, 192 consent searches 193 and the emergency aid exception. 194
The existence of those other exceptions does not mean that the
reasoning in Cruz is invalid, as state courts may apply more restrictive
search and seizure requirements than those required by the Fourth
Amendment. 195 The existence of those exceptions means only that the
unavailability of a search warrant may not be of constitutional
significance.
States that authorize the issuance of search warrants for infraction
violations will not be able to follow the reasoning of Cruz. The Cruz
court identified Maine as such a state. 196 Similarly, the California Penal
Code allows for a search warrant to be obtained “[w]hen the property
or things are in the possession of any person with the intent to use them
as a means of committing a public offense. . . .” 197 The California Penal
Code defines “public offenses” as including infractions, 198 so it follows
that in California a warrant could be issued to search for items of
evidence in infraction cases, so long as they were used as “means” of
committing the offense. As such, courts in states such as Maine and
California could still reach balancing, even if they followed the
reasoning of the Cruz court.
C. States that Do Not Classify Infractions as Crimes May Not Reach
Balancing
There is another way in which some courts may disallow a search
under the automobile exception based on an infraction violation, before
reaching balancing. A search under the automobile exception requires
187.
Part V.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 903 (Mass. 2011); see discussion supra
Id. at 912 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276 § 2B (2010)).
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 913 (Mass. 2011).
See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 380 (1976).
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973).
See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006).
See People v. Scott, N.E.2d 1328, 1335–39 (N.Y. 1992).
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 913 n.31 (Mass. 2011).
CAL. PEN. CODE § 1524(a)(3) (West 2012).
Id. § 16.
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that the search be for crime evidence or contraband. 199 In a state where
infractions are not considered to be “crimes” and the target of the
search is not contraband, a search based on an infraction violation
could not possibly locate crime evidence or contraband, related to that
infraction. As such, a court could disallow a search before even
beginning the balancing analysis.
The court in Cruz reasoned that if an offense is not classified as a
crime, a search based on that offense is unreasonable,200 and disallowed
the search because infractions were not classified as criminal offenses
in Massachusetts. 201 In Smalley, the court was able to skirt the issue of
the non-criminal offense classification. The court validated the search,
reasoning that the evidence in question was marijuana, which was
contraband. As such, the search was valid because the Oregon
automobile exception 202 allowed probable cause searches to find either
crime evidence or contraband. 203
However, in a future case where the target of a search is neither
crime evidence nor contraband, even the Oregon court may be forced
to disallow a search. For example, if the search in question was for a
cellular phone used to text while driving, 204 or a dash camera video of a
red light violation,205 that evidence would be neither crime evidence
nor contraband. As such, even the reasoning of the Smalley court
would require the conclusion that the search did not fall within the
automobile exception. 206
CONCLUSION
The question as to whether a search based on an infraction
violation can be justified under the automobile exception has not been
199. Supra Part II.A.
200. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d at 910 (“Ferreting out decriminalized conduct with the same
fervor associated with the pursuit of serious criminal conduct is n[ot] desired by the public .
. . .”).
201. Id. (“Given our conclusion that G.L. c. 94C, §§ 32L-32N, has changed the status of
possession one ounce or less of marijuana from a crime to a civil violation, without at least
some other additional fact to bolster a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the odor of
burnt marijuana alone cannot reasonably provide suspicion of criminal activity to justify an
exit order.”); but see People v. Waxler, No. A137796, 2014 WL 935470, at *10 (Cal. Ct.
App. Mar. 11, 2014) (“ [P]ossession of up to an ounce of nonmedical marijuana in
California is a ‘crime.’ ”).
202. The history of the Oregon “automobile exception” varies from the Supreme Court
case history, but the rule is ultimately the same. State v. Smalley, 225 P.3d 844, 848 (Or.
Ct. App. 2010).
203. Id.
204. OR. VEH. CODE. § 811.507 (2).
205. Id. § 811.260 (7).
206. See supra Part V.
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fully addressed by the courts. It is now emerging as an issue, as
technology becomes more pervasive, regulation becomes more
targeted, and marijuana possession is decriminalized. As these trends
continue, there will continue be an increase in the number of vehicle
stops where evidence or contraband is recoverable.
The Supreme Court decisions setting the bright-line rule currently
used to evaluate probable cause vehicle searches all involved crimes
classified as either felonies or misdemeanors. However, where an
offense is classified as an infraction, there is a meaningful difference
between that offense and more serious offenses such as misdemeanors
and felonies. That difference changes the result when weighing
reasonableness. The decreased weight of an infraction tips the scales
so that the government’s interest no longer outweighs the individual’s
expectation of privacy and any search based on an infraction violation
becomes unreasonable. Both the application of the Court’s balancing
test and public policy require an adjustment to the bright-line rule so
that police may only conduct a search of a motor vehicle when there is
probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence or
contraband related to a misdemeanor or felony.

